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Introduction
1 
 
‘Europeanisation’ has become a focal point of discussion in European integration 
studies. Although the term is used in different ways to describe a variety of phenomena, 
its meanings have usually been restricted to (in a strict sense) political processes, i.e. 
domestic political changes caused by European integration. Most studies have 
emphasised top-down dynamics inherent in this particular notion of Europeanisation, 
whereas bottom-up and/or transnational processes and attempts to analyse their 
interplay have entered the debate only recently. We seek to contribute to this debate by 
focusing on what we describe as the ‘societal/trans-national’ dimension of 
Europeanisation: this dimension encapsulates (1) the level and sphere of change; and 
(2) the type of agency generating or resisting change. 
In this paper, we seek to analyse the impact of European-level governance – the 
case law of the European Court of Justice and the Community’s competences in the area 
of competition policy – on German football. More particularly we will look at the 
nationality issue related to the Bosman ruling (case 1), the new transfer regime resulting 
from the Bosman ruling (case 2), and the issue of broadcasting rights (case 3). In the 
broader context, additional factors are considered which less clearly relate to the 
European integration process, such as the development of the Champions League (case 
4) or the emergence of transnational groupings like the G-14 (case 5). Taken together, 
these processes add up to the ongoing ‘Europeanisation’ of (German) football. 
   By analysing five cases of Europeanisation within the realm of German football, 
we not only want to shed some light on an under-researched field of study for political 
scientists interested in ‘Europeanising’ mechanisms. It also allows us to explore the 
general applicability of Europeanisation factors (sources, dynamics and level of 
change), which have been derived mainly from the analysis of more politico-economic 
contexts, to explain dynamics in societal, i.e. rather non-political, contexts. This way we 
may also clarify potential ‘blind-spots’, i.e. dynamics and interrelated mechanisms in 
Europeanisation processes that have been largely ignored by traditional analyses. Our 
empirical focus is salient as it represents a social context, which forms an important and 
conscious part of citizens’ lives (rather than an abstract and inaccessible sphere). This 
                                                 
1 An earlier version of this paper has been presented for the Workshop “Sport and the European Union, 
10 Years After Bosman: Situation and Perspectives”, Loughborough University (UK), 30 June & 1 July 
2006. We would like to thank Frank Schimmelfennig and Osvaldo Croci for their comments on previous 
drafts.  
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may enable us to gain a deeper understanding of Europeanisation regarding citizens’ life 
worlds. 
Our paper will first elucidate the concept of Europeanisation and specify our 
understanding of the term. Secondly, we will outline the societal/transnational 
dimension of Europeanisation. The third section attempts to formulate some systemising 
factors of the Europeanisation process which guides our empirical analysis of five sub-
cases related to German football that will follow thereafter. 
 
 
The concept of Europeanisation 
 
Research on Europeanisation has gradually increased since the mid-1990s and has 
developed into an academic growth industry over the last decade. In the field of political 
science alone, the term Europeanisation is used in a number of different ways to 
describe a variety of phenomena and processes of change (cf. Olsen 2002). Most 
frequently Europeanisation is referred to as domestic change, in terms of policy 
substance and instruments, processes and politics as well as polity caused by European 
integration (Radaelli 2000: 3; Ladrech 1994: 69). Existing policies (in integrated 
sectors) are increasingly defined at the European level which leads to substantial 
changes in the policy fabric (and content) of EU member states (Caporaso and Jupille 
2000). On the level of politics, European governance impacts on domestic processes of 
political and societal interest representation and aggregation as well as on the policy 
style (e.g. Hartcourt and Radaelli 1999). In terms of polity, Europeanisation focuses on 
the effect of European integration on domestic (mainly political) structures and 
institutions (Börzel 2001). 
  As a field of inquiry, Europeanisation merits continued systematic academic 
attention. The Europeanisation research agenda arguably focuses on a set of very 
important research questions, related to where, how, why, and to what extent domestic 
change occurs as a consequence of EU integration and governance at the European 
level. In addition, compared to several decades that European integration studies have 
focused on explaining and describing the emergence and development of a 
supranational system of European cooperation, research on Europeanisation is still in its 
infancy.   
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As a starting point, Europeanisation is understood here as the process of change 
in the domestic arena resulting from the European level of governance. However, 
Europeanisation is not viewed as a unidirectional but as a two-way-process which 
develops both top-down and bottom-up. Top-down perspectives largely emphasise 
vertical developments from the European to the domestic level (Ladrech 1994, Schmidt 
2002). Bottom-up accounts stress the national influence concerning European level 
developments (which in turn feeds back into the domestic realm). This perspective 
highlights that Member States are more than passive receivers of European-level 
pressures. They may shape policies and institutions on the European level to which they 
have to adjust at a later stage (Börzel 2002). By referring to Europeanisation as a two-
way process our conceptualisation underlines the interdependence between the 
European and domestic levels for an explanation of Europeanisation (processes). In 
contrast to a unidirectional top-down usage of the concept, studying Europeanisation as 
a two-way process entails certain disadvantages in terms of (waning) conceptual 
parsimony and methodological straightforwardness. However, we argue that these 
problems are outweighed by a substantially greater ability to capture important 
empirical phenomena. It has convincingly been shown, for example, that Member States 
responses to Europeanisation processes feed back into the European level of decision-
making. European/EU policies, institutions and processes cannot be taken as given, but 
are, at least to some extent, the result of domestic political preferences and processes 
which are acted out on the European level (Börzel 2002, 2003; Dyson 1999). 
However, as will be further specified later on, framing Europeanisation 
processes as the interplay between the European and the domestic realm still constitutes 
a considerable simplification. For example, transnational (non-EU)-level developments 
may provide important properties of Europeanisation. In addition, related to the 
previous point, it should be pointed out that for us Europeanisation does not equate 
‘EUisation’. Rather the EU is only part (albeit an important one) of the wider fabric of 
cross-border regimes in Europe in which other (transnational) institutions and 
frameworks, both formal and informal, also play a role. Hence the EU is not the 
monopoly source and channel of Europeanisation (Wallace 2000). This may include 
institutional arrangements at the European level which are related to European 
(integration and) cooperation in a broader sense, such as the Council of Europe (COE) 
or the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) on the political  
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level, but also organisations such as the Association Européenne des Conservatoires 
(AEC) and the European Football Association (UEFA) on the societal level. 
While working with a fairly wide notion of Europeanisation, it is important to 
clearly delimit the concept in order to avoid the danger of overstretching it. For 
example, we would reject “the emergence and development at the European level of 
distinct structures of governance” as an appropriate definition of Europeanisation (Risse 
et al. 2001: 3; emphasis added). Although our conceptualisation relates to multi-level 
processes, the core focus remains on the process of change in the domestic arena. In 
addition, Europeanisation should not be confused with ‘harmonisation’ and also differs 
from ‘convergence’. Europeanisation may lead to harmonisation and convergence, but 
this is not necessarily the case. Empirical findings indicate that Europeanisation may 
have a differential impact on national policy-making and that it leaves considerable 
margin for domestic diversities (cf. Héritier et al. 2001; Caporaso and Jupille 2001). 
Moreover, as pointed out by Radaelli (2000: 5) there is a difference between a process 
(Europeanisation) and its consequences (e.g. potentially harmonisation and 
convergence).  
 
 
The societal/trans-national dimension of Europeanisation 
 
The proliferating empirical work on Europeanisation revolves around the instruments, 
institutions, actors and mechanisms that induce and resist change. Our empirical 
analysis highlights a rather neglected aspect in the literature: the societal/trans-national 
dimension of Europeanisation. This dimension encapsulates two elements: (1) the level 
and sphere of change; (2) the type of agency generating or resisting change. Hence by 
the societal dimension we mean, on the one hand, the fact that regulation and 
jurisdiction from Brussels is likely to induce some adaptational pressure not only at the 
political level but also in societal contexts, e.g. the realm of sport, and for our purpose, 
football. On the other hand, to speak of a trans-national dimension of Europeanisation 
aims at capturing some trends, which can be traced in analysing how societal actors are 
either reacting towards attempts of regulation by the EU or creating transnational spaces 
that in turn impact on the governance of football. 
As pointed out in the previous section, highlighting the societal/transnational 
dimension contributed to our rather broad conceptualisation of ‘Europeanisation’.  
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Concept-stretching has to be justified, given the potential loss of analytical clarity 
(Radaelli 2000). We argue that accounting for the societal and transnational dimension 
is justified, as otherwise interesting fields of study and important dynamics between the 
European and the domestic levels would go largely unnoticed. 
As has been noted, the societal dimension of Europeanisation mainly indicates 
the sphere of change. In contrast to most studies we chose to study a subject (football, 
or sports in general), which is seemingly ‘non-political’. What makes such a case 
interesting, besides the fact that it constitutes a more politicised realm than commonly 
assumed, is that it represents a social context, which forms an important and conscious 
part of citizens’ ‘life world’ (Lebenswelt). It is therefore a context, which is realised by 
many people as part of their lives – not a supposedly abstract and inaccessible sphere of 
politics. To study processes of Europeanisation at this – societal – level thereby should 
allow for a deeper understanding of any Europeanisation regarding citizens’ life worlds. 
Although this is not a major theme in our paper, the question of a Europeanisation of 
life worlds could lead to interesting insights in the eventual formation of a common 
European identity, a subject much debated in the current literature (cf. Risse 2004; 
Mayer and Palmowski 2004). Aside from these considerations, to study Europeanisation 
dynamics within a societal field like ‘football’ maybe salient for two reasons. First, it 
allows us to explore the applicability of Europeanisation concepts (sources, dynamics 
and level of change), which have been derived mainly from the analysis of more 
political contexts, to rather non-political, i.e. here societal, contexts? Second, our study 
may clarify potential ‘blind-spots’, i.e. dynamics and interrelated mechanisms in 
Europeanisation processes that have been largely ignored by traditional analyses, which 
have mainly dealt with political issues. 
Although it would be wrong to assert that ‘transnational dimensions’ of 
Europeanisation have only rarely been mentioned, the concept of ‘transnationalism’ 
itself is less frequently specified and illustrated empirically in Europeanisation studies.
2 
The transnational quality of relationships is often merely stated or an ongoing 
transnationalisation within EU-Europe is simply assumed (e.g. Menz 2003, Winn 2003, 
Feron 2004). Yet, it is questionable whether the debate on concepts of transnationalism 
                                                 
2 But see, for instance, Kohler-Koch (2002), who sketches out several dimensions of transnationalism 
within the complex system(s) of European governance.  
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and transnational actors in the discipline of International Relations
3 offers any sensible 
starting points for our approach, mainly because this debate is “still primarily concerned 
with proving against a state-centered picture of world politics that [transnational actors] 
matter” (Risse 2002: 268). In the context of (European) integration studies, scholars 
working in the transactionist, neofunctionalist or supranational governance perspective 
have of course somewhat gone beyond that and developed accounts of transnational 
dynamics (e.g. Deutsch 1953, 1957; Haas 1958; Stone Sweet and Sandholtz 1997; cf. 
Niemann 2006 forthcoming). However, their focus was above all on the development of 
cooperation, institutions and policies at the supranational level, i.e. on (European) 
integration, rather than Europeanisation with its primary focus on change in the 
domestic arena. 
While not diverging from a common definition of ‘transnationalism’, our 
concept also encompasses actors that have been less analysed in the current literature 
which heavily focuses on either non-profit NGOs or profit–driven multinational 
corporations. We define ‘transnational actors’ as societal actors in a broad sense, who 
coordinate their actions with societal actors from other national contexts in Europe, 
thereby creating common, trans-national reactions towards EU institutions and/or 
creating trans-national institutions. Transnationalism within Europe in our approach 
therefore rests on transboundary networks of actors, whose interests and perceptions are 
either aggregated or amalgamated within these networks and institutions.  
To speak of a ‘societal/transnational dimension’ of Europeanisation in the end 
means to pay tribute to the interrelatedness of the sphere of change and the type of 
agency: football as a societal sphere is characterised by a growing transnationalisation, 
as will be shown. Opening up the field of Europeanisation studies to this dimension 
further adds to the awareness of the impressive complexity of Europeanisation 
processes, but it may also incorporate the consciously perceived ‘Europeanised’ life 
worlds of European citizens into the academic debate. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 For an overview of this debate see Risse (2002). For a discussion of the methodological implications of 
transnationalisation within EU-Europe for International Relations see Ebbinghaus (1998).  
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The Europeanisation process: some systemising factors 
 
Different typologies can be introduced in order to systematise Europeanisation 
processes. This section will formulate several systematisations, which are to some 
extent derived from the existing literature. Subsequently, our empirical analysis will 
explore to what extent such typology of the Europeanisation process makes sense, also 
in terms of the more transnationally driven sub-cases. To begin with, the basic sources 
of Europeanisation – top-down, bottom-up and transnational/societal – have already 
been sufficiently pointed out above and thus require no further explication here. 
Although these sources of Europeanisation often substantially interact, certain 
tendencies in terms of these dimensions can usually be ascertained (cf. Lodge 2002).   
Secondly, we can differentiate in terms of the level of strength of 
Europeanisation sources and pressures. As for top-town processes, a number of 
indicators can be suggested. The legal bindingness of EU provisions probably 
constitutes the best indicator for the force of top-down pressures (Vink 2002: 9-10). 
Yet, Europeanisation is not confined to legally binding EU provisions. It may be carried 
by more cognitive or ideational mechanisms. Although termed the “weakest” 
Europeanisation trigger (Knill 2001: 221), the “framing of domestic beliefs and 
expectations” still seems to drive Europeanisation processes forward to some extent 
(Knill and Lehmkuhl 2002: 258).
4 In addition, the degree of clarity, both in terms of 
legal argumentation (e.g. concerning ECJ rulings) and in terms of legal competence 
(e.g. regarding exclusive or shared competence in the case of Commission involvement) 
influences the weight of downwards adaptational pressures. Ambiguity in these respects 
adversely affects Europeanisation dynamics. Moreover, the level of uniformity of 
reaching a decision at the European level – e.g. in the Council or between the Council 
and the European Parliament on legislative acts, or in the European Commission 
concerning decisions in the area of competition policy – also impacts on the strength of 
top-down Europeanisation sources and pressures. It can be assumed that, generally 
speaking, more uniform and consensual decisions at European level may have a more 
significant Europeanisation effect than rather contested EU decisions. As for bottom-up 
or transnational/societal Europeanisation, indicators regarding the strength of processes 
                                                 
4 The role of cognitive and ideational factors applies equally to the domestic and transnational/societal 
dimensions. These may also frame beliefs and expectations on other levels and thus impact on the 
Europeanisation process. This will be suggested in more detail later on in our empirical analysis regarding 
the influence of the Champions League on a potentially emerging European public space.  
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seem less obvious and perhaps more limited at this stage of inquiry. However, for 
example the existence of alternative (policy) venues or of credible exit options from 
prevailing arrangements and, more generally, the possibility of challenging existing 
regimes (e.g. when undesired policy externalities arise) condition the strength of such 
Europeanisation dynamics (cf. Lodge 2002).  
Our third categorisation concerns reactions to initial Europeanisation pressures. 
Broadly speaking, one can distinguish between reactions on two levels: the level of 
policy formulation and the level of implementation (cf. Bugdahn 2005: 183). The type 
of reaction in terms of formulation and implementation depends on several factors, such 
as prevailing norms and preferences on the part of those affected or addressed by the 
initial Europeanisation pressures – and partly overlapping with actors’ preferences – the 
goodness of fit, i.e. the compatibility between the (e.g. domestic) status-quo and newly 
induced (e.g. EU) requirements. On the level of (policy) formulation, we suggest that 
reactions to primary Europeanisation can take on different forms: (1) ‘support’, when 
affected/addressed actors back new requirements; (2) ‘acquiescence’, when agents 
simply accept the changes stemming from Europeanisation; (3) 
‘engagement/intervention’, when actors seek to modify or reduce adaptational 
pressures; (4) ‘confrontation’, when actors try to resist or escape initial Europeanisation 
pressures. The degree of misfit can be assumed to gradually increase on this continuum.  
Our fourth element systematising the Europeanisation processes is the strength 
of reaction to initial Europeanisation pressures. The impact of such responses will 
depend on several factors, one of which is access to government/policy-makers and the 
strategic position in, or ‘membership’ of, policy/advocacy networks. Another factor is 
organisational strength, made up, for example, of material resources, the degree of 
centralisation and cohesiveness, effective management, etc. (Menz 2003). 
Finally, the degree of change can be categorised. Drawing on Lodge (2002) and 
Radaelli (2002) who themselves drew on earlier writings, three main forms concerning 
the impact of Europeanisation pressures are suggested here: (1) ‘system maintenance’, 
which is characterised by a lack of change or the rejection of new requirements; (2) 
‘adjustment’, where existing policy cores are not challenged, but some non-fundamental 
changes are absorbed and new layers may be added to the regime; (3) ‘transformation’, 
which denotes paradigmatic or core policy changes. Our empirical data will 
subsequently be examined, as far as possible, with regard to the above categorisations  
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making up Europeanisation processes (i.e. sources, strength of initial pressures, 
reaction, strength of reaction, and degree of change). 
Our empirical analysis is based on process tracing (Keown and  George 1985), 
which has been put into practice through triangulation across different data sources 
(official documentation, structured/unstructured interviews, secondary literature and 
major media). We have chosen to examine five different cases. These ensure variation 
concerning the degree of EU/European level incentives/pressures in order to be able to 
explore the plausibility of our systematisations across a wide range of different 
scenarios and so as to be capable of examining the causal relevance of the EU/European 
level. No or little variation in terms of EU pressures may not allow us to ascertain any 
positive degree of causality (cf. Collier 1995). Our first three sub-cases – (1) Bosman I: 
the nationality issue; (2) Bosman II: the transfer regime; (3) broadcasting – are 
characterised by rather top-down (EU) pressures, albeit to varying degrees, while the 
last two sub-cases – (4) Champions League; (5) G-14 – are more induced by bottom-up 
and transnational rationales.
5 
 
 
Case 1 – The Bosman Ruling I: The Nationality Issue 
 
Some important trends in German football during the last decade can be interpreted as 
symptoms of an ongoing Europeanisation. This is because a whole complex of such 
trends – the rapid influx of foreign-born players, various attempts to restrict their 
numbers as well as to promote young German talents, and the search for a new ‘transfer 
regime’ at the global (through the World Football Association FIFA) and the national 
level – has its roots in the seminal ‘Bosman ruling’ of the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ) in 1995. ‘Bosman’, in this regard, is not only the one legal case every football 
player and fan knows (Foster 2000: 39). The ruling and its antecedents, which have 
been described in detail elsewhere (cf. Croci 2001, Parrish 2003, Weatherill 2003), 
together with a relatively active role of the European Commission in the realm of sports 
during the 1990s also had a tremendous impact on German football.  
The provisions in the Treaty establishing the European Community, secondary 
legislation, Community policies and decisions all had an increasing impact on sport 
                                                 
5 For a more detailed account of our methodological approach, see Brand and Niemann (2005).  
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throughout Europe in the last decade, although ‘sport’ has never been among the core 
competences of the EC/EU (Ducrey et al. 2003: 32). Traditionally, sport as well as 
football in all its aspects (organisation of events, establishment and enforcement of rules 
for both games and events, etc.) has traditionally been regulated by a set of autonomous, 
interrelated organisations, in the case of football by clubs, national leagues and 
associations, several regional federations and one worldwide football federation (Croci 
2001: 2). During the 1990s, however, football more and more came to be recognised as 
an economic activity by European/EU institutions like the Commission and the 
European Court of Justice, and thus as an activity, which had to be regulated like any 
other industry according to the rules of the Community. That is why the jurisdiction of 
the ECJ and the decisions taken by the Commission could generate intense adaptational 
pressure on German football clubs, leagues and the German Football Association 
(DFB). 
The Bosman ruling of the ECJ in 1995 in its essence consisted of two general 
findings, which had been derived from EU law concerning the free movement of people 
within the European Union and competition law, albeit it only drew on the former. The 
two findings were: first, the traditional transfer system with transfer fees to be paid for 
out-of-contract players infringed upon the right of every European (worker) to move 
freely under Article 48 of the Treaty of Rome (TEC) and thus had to be abolished; and 
second, ‘nationality restrictions’ as a means to limit the number of foreign players in a 
football club were ruled illegal in so far as they discriminated against players from 
countries within the European Union (Foster 2000: 42). 
Football in Germany has been affected by both aspects, although one could 
claim that the latter one has had a more ‘visible’ effect for the whole football 
community. Rendering illegal any general nationality restriction in the first place meant 
the abolishment of the so-called ‘3+2 rule’ – negotiated at the beginning of the 1990s 
among UEFA members upon a general recommendation of the European Commission 
to consider nationality clauses – which allowed a European team to field three foreign 
players and additionally two ‘assimilated players’ (foreign players who had played in 
the relevant country for at least five consecutive years). To abolish this rule and to open 
up the market for players from all other countries within the EU already had an in-built 
tendency to increase the number of foreign-born players in German football. The DFB, 
however, liberalised even further and expanded the right to play professional football in 
Germany without being considered a foreigner not only to EU residents (so-called EU- 
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Ausländer) but to all players living within the 51 other member states of the European 
Football Association (UEFA). In fact, thus in German football after ‘Bosman’ the status 
of EU-Ausländer really meant UEFA-Ausländer, EU resident meant UEFA resident, at 
least concerning the two professional leagues.
6  
How to account for this extension, which has been exceptional in Europe? One 
line of argumentation refers to the special socio-political situation in Germany after re-
unification. From this perspective, the DFB and its leading actors were still influenced 
and impressed by the dramatic political changes in Europe and the ‘unification’ of the 
continent that had taken place a few years before. They simply “did not want to erect 
new walls or barriers”, especially towards national associations in Central and Eastern 
Europe, which had strong ties to the DFB.
7 In a similar vein, some actors were 
convinced that the ongoing process of European integration would render any 
differentiation between certain types of Europeans meaningless sooner or later.
8 
Although the extension may show that “football sometimes is more political than people 
think”
9, there was also an element of pragmatic (and even visionary) thinking to it, 
because the decision taken by the DFB in the end prevented non-EU European 
footballers from taking legal action against this discrimination.
10 Another interpretation 
is that this extension created a bigger market for German football clubs to sign players, 
especially players from Central and Eastern Europe, which for the most part was cost-
saving in the short-run. Given the fact that after ‘Bosman’ a central source of financing 
for clubs – transfer fees for out-of-contract players – ceased to exist, and that German 
clubs were (and are) subject to a relatively strict licensing procedure, which means they 
had (and have) to pursue fairly sound economic policies, opening up the market 
especially towards Eastern Europe also had a compensation effect for German football 
clubs, since signing players from Poland or the Balkans was in general less expensive. 
Both explanations – the socio-political climate as well as an interest of the clubs to 
                                                 
6 This extension has not become effective for junior or amateur teams, where EU resident really means 
EU resident. 
7 Interview with Dr. Theo Zwanziger, Managing President of the DFB, by telephone, January 2005.  
8 Interview with Gerhard Mayer-Vorfelder, then-President of the DFB, by telephone, January 2005. 
9 Interview with Dr. Theo Zwanziger, Managing President of the DFB, by telephone, January 2005. 
10 Only recently, the ECJ has issued a ruling concerning the discrimination of a European but non-EU 
professional player (from Russia), who had been restricted from playing by a nationality clause in Spain. 
The ECJ ruled this discrimination illegal on the grounds of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement 
between Russia and the EU, see e.g. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 13 April 2005, and Neue Zürcher 
Zeitung, 13 April 2005. The ‘Simutenkow ruling’ from 2005, from this perspective, can be regarded as 
the logical extension of the ‘Bosman ruling’.  
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improve their position among European competitors – can be seen as complimentary 
rather than mutually exclusive. To sum it up, the ‘nationality part’ of ECJ’s Bosman 
ruling generated a relatively strong pressure on the German Football Association. It also 
induced a considerable dynamic with regard to the decision to extend its definition of 
‘EU resident’ leading to some form of progressive transposition of the ruling through 
the DFB. 
It is hardly surprising that this decision led to a surge of players coming to 
Germany from all over Europe, a claim that can be substantiated by looking at the 
developments of the First Bundesliga. At the beginning of the 1990s – before ‘Bosman’ 
– the shares of the respective players’ groups of the overall number of players exhibit a 
fairly stable pattern: approx. 80% German-born players, 12-14% UEFA residents 
(without Germans), 5-7% non-UEFA residents. After ‘Bosman’ and the decision of the 
DFB to count all players from UEFA member-states as EU residents, we can easily 
detect some important changes in the composition of the players. Firstly, the share of 
German-born players has steadily decreased (accounting for 50% in 2005). Secondly, 
the share of UEFA residents as well as the share of players from other continents has 
substantially increased, although the share of non-UEFA residents remains relatively 
small (between 12 and 14% in 2003 and 2004) compared to that of UEFA residents (up 
to 38% in 2005). As for increases in size this means that the number of German-born-
players has decreased by almost 40% and the shares of non German-born players have 
increased, in the case of UEFA residents by approx. 175%.
11 Although the decision to 
open the market for all Europeans has been rather liberal, the DFB did not fully 
liberalise until 2006/07, when it decided to abolish any limit on foreign players in 
professional clubs, while 12 German players have to be signed (‘local player rule’ of 
UEFA). 
 If one interprets the shortage of young and talented German football players, 
which became obvious at the end of the 1990s, either as a consequence of ‘Bosman’ and 
its implementation in Germany or as the result of a certain neglect on the part of the 
clubs, the carefully directed development of young and talented players, which are 
eligible for German national teams, has become a real concern of the DFB in the wake 
of ‘Bosman’. What is more, the DFB – in accordance with the German Football League 
(DFL) – also tries to steer the development by establishing certain rules for professional 
                                                 
11 These data concern the number of players fielded in the German First Bundesliga 1992-2005. Data 
obtained from IMP AG Ismaning/Germany.  
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and amateur clubs, which aim at developing and protecting young and talented German 
players as far as possible within the limits of public national and European law. For 
instance, every club in the Bundesliga  has to maintain a training centre for young 
players (Nachwuchsleistungszentrum) in order to comply with the licensing rules. 
Amateur clubs of professional teams until now had to field at least six eligible players 
younger than 24, three of them younger than 21; starting with the 2005/06-season, these 
clubs have become full U23-teams (which means that only three players aged 23 or 
older can be fielded). Parallel to these measures, the number of non-EU players in 
German amateur teams has been cut back from up to six (2002) to three (2004). This 
kind of ‘steering policy’ within the association is complemented by the policies of the 
German Ministry of the Interior, which in 2002 issued a directive that in effect ruled out 
that a non-EU player will get a work permit in Germany unless he is signed by a team in 
the (first and second) Bundesliga. In 2003, the follow-up to this directive specified that 
non-EU players must be signed to play in the first team and must not play in the 
amateur teams of the professional clubs.
12 
In sum, the nationality-related part of ‘Bosman’ led to a mixed reaction of the 
DFB: there have been reactions of course, but not full-fledged counter pressure to 
European institutions. Transposition has been varied: progressive (the decision to 
extend the definition of ‘EU resident’) and more conservative (measures to promote 
German talents). German football has thus become ‘Europeanised’ through adapting to 
the ECJ’s ruling. In this sense, the counter pressure towards EU-level decisions by the 
German Football Association has been only moderate.  
 
 
Case 2 – Bosman II: The new ‘transfer regime’ 
 
As has been said above, the ‘Bosman’ ruling not only dealt with the ‘nationality 
question’, it also stated that the traditional transfer system had to be completely revised, 
since the core of this system – the payment of transfer fees for out-of-contract players – 
had been found to infringe upon the right of free movement within the EU. The ruling 
itself posed a lot of questions, because among other things it did not consider transfers 
                                                 
12 Kicker, 27 January 2003; EU player in this regard means a player born within a member state of the 
EU, where the rights concerning the free movement of labour do apply (at this time, this still excludes the 
new member-states like Poland, Hungary etc.).  
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within member states of the EU and made no specifications concerning transfers of 
European but non-EU players between two clubs within the EU. Since the transfer 
system was internationally agreed upon and laid down through FIFA, it became clear 
during the second half of the 1990s that this part of ‘Bosman’ was not just (EU- or 
UEFA-) European business, but could and had to lead to a revision of the whole 
international transfer system. First and foremost the Commission pushed this view, 
starting from the perspective that football constituted a normal business activity to be 
regulated according to competition law. On the other side, the national and regional 
associations as well as FIFA tried to promote their view that football and sport fulfil 
special social functions and therefore had to be treated differently. As Parrish (2003) has 
shown, these actors as well as others – clubs, leagues, media, and lawyers – have 
formed ‘advocacy coalitions’ to promote their views in the negotiation process. The 
overhaul of the international transfer system has been a long process, in which all actors 
tried to influence the other side on several occasions. The uncertainties sketched above 
thereby led to the protraction of this process, since they created some room for 
manoeuvre for the national associations and FIFA/UEFA. Although the Commission 
finally pushed them to the table by threatening another ruling through the ECJ in 2000 
(Croci 2001: 7), the ‘new transfer regime’ agreed upon in 2001 suggested that the 
European Commission in some parts had loosened its demands and abandoned its 
purism. This is especially true with regard to contract stability (vs. ‘normal’ periods of 
notice), which still has to be guaranteed except for narrowly defined situations, and the 
introduction of a new system of training compensations (as a ‘quasi’-transfer fee) for 
players aged under 23 to encourage and reward training efforts of clubs (cf. Weatherill 
2003: 68). This change in attitude of the Commission merits attention and needs to be 
explained. How was it possible that „[a]fter reaching the compromise agreement with 
the European Commission [in 2001], FIFA President Blatter, …, publicly thanked 
Competition Commissioner Mario Monti with words that gave the impression that the 
Commission had simply acted as a consultant to FIFA to improve its transfer rules“ 
(Croci/Forster 2004: 16)?  
One could reason that the Commission has been persuaded by the arguments 
concerning the peculiarities of organising football and the presumed consequences of a 
fully liberalised transfer regime put forth through FIFA (and the DFB as well). Indeed, 
some leading German football officials interpret the negotiation process with the 
Commission to some degree as a successful act of lobbying in the sense of creating  
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more awareness within the Commission for possible disastrous consequences of strict 
liberalisation (e.g. inoperability of leagues because of highly volatile player markets).
13 
There are indeed some indicators that underscore this reasoning, since the Commission 
gradually reformulated its position throughout the 1990s, as can be seen in the so-called 
Helsinki Report on Sport from 1999 (Brown 2000: 139). Secondly, several national 
football associations, not least the German DFB, have lobbied and convinced their 
respective governments and especially their heads of government in order to exert some 
political pressure on the institutions of the Community, although mainly in form of 
public statements. In this regard, the joint statement of Gerhard Schröder and Tony 
Blair in the run-up to the Nice Summit 2000 – which expressed their concerns regarding 
a radical restructuring without enough consideration given to the peculiarities of 
football (Meier 2004: 14) – has been brought about also by several meetings of the 
DFB, representatives of leading German clubs and the German Chancellor, in which the 
‘football community’ successfully specified possible adverse implications of a fully 
liberalised transfer regime for the most popular sport in Germany.
14 Access to policy-
makers has therefore been a crucial resource for the DFB and other national football 
associations. Undoubtedly, the common stance of national governments exerted indirect 
political pressure on the Commission, which can act with some degree of autonomy in 
competition policy but certainly does not take its decisions in a political vacuum. Thus, 
one can detect both engagement (attempts to modify the pressure of the ECJ’s ruling 
and the Commission’s claims) and more confrontational elements (attempts to resist and 
oppose pressures through organising political counter pressure) among the reactions of 
the DFB and FIFA. 
Two of the most important aspects of the ‘new transfer regime’ agreed upon by 
FIFA and the Commission, besides the rules concerning contract stability, are the fixing 
of training compensations for players aged under 23 and in general the principle that 
clubs involved in training and education of young players should be rewarded.
15 The 
payment of training compensation in this regard is in some ways a continuation of the 
old transfer fee payments for out-of-contract players, albeit at a lower level and only 
with regard to young and amateur players. This adds to the judgement that the ‘new 
transfer regime’ agreed upon by FIFA and the Commission resembles not a complete 
                                                 
13 Interview with Gerhard Mayer-Vorfelder, then-President of the DFB,, by telephone, January 2005. 
14 Interview with Gerhard Mayer-Vorfelder, then-President of the DFB, by telephone, January 2005. 
15 Press Release European Commission, IP/02/824, 5 June 2002  
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overhaul of the old system but rather a case of ‘heavy adjustment’. The compensation 
payments themselves are more or less ‘peanuts’ for the bigger clubs, because they only 
partially help refinancing their training costs for young and amateur players, but they 
are of substantial importance for smaller clubs. Their introduction according to FIFA 
rules by the DFB, however, has been ruled illegal in 2004 by the Regional Superior 
Court Oldenburg, which argued that they infringed on the freedom to choose a 
profession (Article 12, German Basic Law). In essence, this ruling constitutes a 
‘national Bosman ruling’ for the realm of amateur football. Since the Court underscored 
that the DFB may have complied with FIFA rules, but that the rules of private 
organisations like FIFA in any case have to abide by national as well as European law, 
one can foresee that this ruling (recently confirmed by the Regional Court of Appeal), 
will not end the discussions, which have as their seminal reference the ‘Bosman ruling’ 
of the ECJ.
16  
In sum, the ‘Bosman’ ruling undoubtedly changed the structures and the 
landscape of German football. Concerning the make-up of the Bundesliga it has become 
above all less German, more international, and more European in a wider sense. 
Through the decision of the DFB to count all citizens of UEFA member-states as EU 
residents, German football has become more ‘Europeanised’ than required through the 
Commission and the ECJ. Other processes in German football have shown as well that 
‘Europeanisation’ through European jurisdiction and institutions is far from being a 
one-way street. Although the EU can exert some adaptational pressure, there have 
always been attempts to seek ways to escape some of the consequences of adaptation 
(development and protective measures for young players, in the realm of amateur 
football) or to weaken the pressure (persuasion and counter-pressure through lobbying 
in the case of a new international transfer regime). While the “Bosman nationality 
regime” has led to a ‘system transformation’ in German (and other domestic) soccer, the 
“Bosman transfer regime” has had less far-reaching implications, especially given the 
fact that contract stability is still maintained under the revised transfer rules. Here, the 
impact of change resulting from European integration might thus better be described as 
‘heavy adjustment’. 
 
                                                 
16 Ruling of the Regional Superior Court Oldenburg/Urteil des LG Oldenburg, Az.: 13 O 1195/04, 29 
October 2004. The Federal Court of the DFB had to abide by this ruling when, in August 2006, it finally 
abolished these compensation payments. See Kicker, 28 August 2006.  
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Case 3 – Broadcasting rights: the Bundesliga marketing system 
 
Over the past decade, the transformation of the broadcasting sector has had a significant 
impact on professional football in most European countries, including Germany. The 
sharp growth in the number of actors on the demand-side of the market with the advent 
of private television in Germany in the mid-1980s combined with the difficulty of 
increasing the supply of truly attractive football events led to very considerable 
increases in the prices charged for Bundesliga broadcasting rights (at least until the 
‘Kirch-crash’
17), a development that has also been witnessed, to varying degrees, in the 
rest of Europe. Overall, broadcasting is a key element in the larger scale 
commercialisation of football in recent times. This commercialisation of sports (and 
above all football) in Europe has decisively fostered the intervention of EU institutions 
and Community law in the sector. The Commission’s preoccupation with football has 
been driven by its need to monitor the much more important broadcasting sector, in 
which it seeks to preclude practices that facilitate incumbents’ to impede new entrants 
to the market (Weatherill 2003: 74). 
  One of the most contentious issues is concerned with the marketing system of 
broadcasting rights. An established commercial practice in European football, as well as 
the European sports sector more generally, is the central marketing and joint sale of 
broadcasting rights on behalf of individual participants. This system, which currently 
applies to both free-TV and pay-TV broadcasting of the Bundesliga, offers prospective 
buyers only the opportunity to compete for one package which comprises a league’s 
entire output. Purchasers are unable to conclude deals with individual clubs. Such 
collective selling is an equalising arrangement through which revenues are distributed 
more evenly than in a decentralised model. In the latter system the allegedly more 
attractive clubs would take significantly more of the pie (at the expense of smaller 
clubs). The main argument in favour of the collective system is that it helps sustain 
vibrant (inter-club) competition, a crucial element of any sporting activity. For example, 
broadcasting rights for the Bundesliga, the English Premier League and the UEFA 
Champions League are marketed centrally by the DFB/DFL, the FA and UEFA, 
                                                 
17 The Kirch Group which acquired the Bundesliga rights for the period 2000-2004 went into bust in April 
2002.  
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respectively. From the perspective of EU law two issues are important here: firstly, 
whether the prevention of clubs from entering into individual agreements with 
broadcasters amounts to a restriction of competition and thus falls within the scope of 
Article 81 (1) TEC; secondly, whether the collective selling of broadcasting rights is 
necessary to ensure the survival of the financially weaker participants in the league. If 
the above mentioned solidarity argument is accepted, an exemption under Article 81 (3) 
from the application of Article 81 (1) TEC may be granted (Parrish 2002: 9). 
  Although the Commission generally has very significant competencies in 
competition policy (cf. e.g. McGowan 2000), it had already insisted that it did not aspire 
to become a general sports competition policy regulator. The Commission also more 
and more deviated from an orthodox articulation of Articles 81-82 in its 
communications and became increasingly eager in recent years to show respect for the 
social and cultural benefits of sports (cf. Weatherill 2003: 52f, 75, 93f). Hence, overall 
the level of top-down pressures (exerted by the Commission here) was less significant 
than in the previous two sub-cases (interview 2004). 
The DFB requested an exemption from the application of Article 81 with regard 
to the central marketing of television and radio broadcasting rights for professional 
football matches in Germany in 1999. Backed by a large majority of clubs and aided by 
UEFA (and German policy-makers), the DFB sought to reduce EU level adaptational 
pressures. Its reaction can thus be described as intervention/engagement. Such response 
is rational in view of the preferences on the part of the DFB/DFL, UEFA and most 
Bundesliga clubs and given the substantial misfit between the existing regime and that 
suggested by the Commission. 
  Under the German collective selling system the DFB leases the broadcasting 
rights to the DFL which also markets the rights. The DFL redistributes the revenues 
gained from the broadcasting contracts to the clubs. The contracts in question in the 
DFB request for exemption from Article 81 concerned the rights to show first and 
second division Bundesliga games. The DFB/DFL claimed authority to enter into such 
contracts as the main organisers of the competitions. The application for derogation 
from Article 81 was substantiated with reference to the solidarity function which the 
central marketing system supposedly fulfils in that funds are redistributed (fairly) 
among clubs. It should be mentioned that this stance is accepted by most officials from 
the DFB and DFL as well as the vast majority of clubs. Among the 36 professional 
German football clubs only Bayern München, Borussia Dortmund and Bayer  
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Leverkusen favoured a decentralised marketing model, given their potential to raise 
(substantially) larger revenues. They also occasionally asserted that overall generated 
income would be higher
18 under a decentralised system and they sporadically threatened 
by referring to exit options, such as a European breakaway league. During the course of 
discussions all clubs eventually accepted the collective selling system. However, later it 
was revealed that Bayern München mainly came on board because of a ‘secret’ 
marketing treaty with the Kirch-Group, which had secured the rights for the period 
2000-2004. In this agreement Bayern München was compensated for lost revenues by 
foregoing individual marketing arrangements. As a result, the club de jure agreed to the 
central marketing model, while de facto securing the financial status of a decentralised 
system. This can be regarded as the introduction of elements of decentralised marketing 
through the back door (Kruse and Quitzau 2003: 13-14). 
  In the DFB request for an exemption from EU antitrust rules, the DFB and the 
DFL made a considerable effort to influence matters. They mainly sought to assert their 
preferences via UEFA. Former DFB President Mayer-Vorfelder was well placed in that 
respect as a member of the UEFA Executive Committee and the Executive Committee 
Working Group on matters related to the European Union. Within the UEFA framework 
DFB officials also participated directly in talks with representatives from the European 
Commission (including Commissioners), members of the European Parliament and 
national ministers responsible for sports. In addition, direct relations were cultivated on 
the part of the DFB with the Commissioners Reading and Monti. The DFB mainly used 
UEFA as a channel also because the latter was (simultaneously to the DFB case) 
involved in talks with the Commission as it had applied for an exemption from Article 
81 concerning the collective marketing of commercial rights to the UEFA Champions 
League. Lobbying (via UEFA) has retrospectively been viewed as an effective means.
19 
Rather than applying direct (political) pressure, it was important in the talks with the 
Commission and other EU circles to bridge certain knowledge gaps and to specify the 
implications of a vigorous application of Community antitrust rules to professional 
football in Germany. Moreover, a certain amount of political pressure spilling over from 
the Bosman case and the subsequent discussions concerning transfer rules
20 provided an 
                                                 
18 However, the literature rather seems to contradict this point (e.g. Weatherill 2003: 77). 
19 Interview with Gerhard Mayer-Vorfelder, then-President of the DFB, by telephone, January 2005. 
20 For example, statements by Gerhard Schröder and Tony Blair as well as provisions in the Amsterdam 
Declaration emphasised the need for the bodies of the European Union to listen to sports associations 
when important questions affecting sports are at issue.  
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additional rationale for the Commission decision to exempt the new system for 
marketing Bundesliga broadcasting rights. These logics also have to be seen against the 
background of growing anxieties on the part of the Commission in recent years to show 
respect for the social and cultural benefits of sports and its decreasing desire to get 
involved in sports policy (cf. Weatherill 2003). 
  In January 2005 the Commission closed the case in view of certain commitments 
made by the DFL. Most significantly, media rights are offered in several packages in a 
transparent and non-discriminatory procedure. However, the new marketing system for 
Bundesliga broadcasting rights contains core demands of the DFB/DFL. The new model 
has been described as ‘essentially a centralised system of marketing broadcasting rights 
with some decentralised elements on the fringes’
21. Even though this interpretation may 
be slightly optimistic, collective marketing of TV rights will broadly continue in one 
important aspect: clubs have only limited scope for selling their games.
22 Overall these 
changes, spurred by EU-level pressures, can be described as ‘partial/modest 
adjustments’, since only moderate alterations were made and important policy cores 
remained (largely) untouched. 
 
 
Case 4 – The Champions League 
 
So far we have predominantly looked at the adaptational pressures stemming from the 
European Union and the transnational and specifically German responses toward these 
pressures. In contrast, this section deals more with transnationally and domestically   
induced changes which have a significant bearing on the policies, structures and 
attitudes governing German (professional) football. The most important factor in that 
respect is the UEFA Champions League. Since the early 1990s there has been 
increasingly strong pressure on UEFA from the big European clubs and media groups to 
expand European club-level football competition in order to exploit its commercial 
potential. UEFA welcomed such ideas given the possibility of (further) raising its 
                                                 
21 Interview with Dr. Christian Hockenjos, Managing Director at Borussia Dortmund, by 
telephone, January 2005. 
22 Clubs can sell their games for various media only after the match. Time frames for selling 
these rights differ across the different media.  For full details see for example European 
Commission (2005).  
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profile and status. As a result, UEFA enlarged the European Champion Clubs’ Cup in 
1992/1993 to include a league format, which has subsequently been called the 
‘Champions League’. Again at the initiative of media companies and the largest 
European clubs, which at times mildly threatened with the exit option (a European 
breakaway league), the league format was expanded in 1997, a step that was 
acquiescenced by UEFA. This allowed for the participation of the runners-up of the 
bigger national leagues and increased the number of matches played, thus raising 
revenues. 
  Once established, the Champions League has itself become a source of 
Europeanisation, thus setting off a “second round” of Europeanisation (Bugdahn 2005: 
183). For example, it has turned into a real focal point for the more competitive 
Bundesliga clubs, a development paralleled across other European football leagues. The 
rationale is two-fold. First, the participation in the Champions League is financially 
very lucrative. For example, in the season 2002/2003 Borussia Dortmund earned 33.7 
million EUR (27.1% of its total revenue) by (merely) reaching the second group stage in 
the Champions League. And in the season 2000/2001 Bayern München gained 41.25 
million EUR – almost twice as much as through total national TV revenues – by 
winning the Champions League that season. It can be argued that, due to the less 
lucrative different domestic TV-marketing conditions, participation in the Champions 
League is even more important for the top German clubs than for their English, Spanish 
or Italian rivals in order to stay competitive on the European level. English clubs can 
draw on huge earnings through their massive national broadcasting contracts. Top 
Italian clubs can raise very considerable revenue because the pay-TV sector is 
decentralised
23. And in Spain both free- and pay-TV is marketed on an individual basis, 
which benefits the most attractive teams disproportionately.  
  Secondly, the Champions League has also become a focal point for the bigger 
German (and other European) clubs because it has developed into a top brand. Part of 
the success story is that it in 2003-04 it contracted eighty-two TV partners in about 230 
countries and islands and was able to increase its world-wide audience/broadcasting 
quota by (another) 9 per cent. In addition, Champions League matches have generated a 
higher average attendance than games in the highest domestic leagues in England, 
                                                 
23 According to one source Juventus Turin has made 93 million EUR through pay-TV during one season 
in the past: interview with Karl-Heinz Rummenigge, Chairman Executive Board, FC Bayern München 
AG, by telephone, December 2004.  
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Germany, Spain, Italy and France.
24 Another indicator for the development of the 
Champions League brand is the continuity and fidelity of its sponsors: Ford, Mastercard 
and Amstel have all sponsored the Champions League from the outset or joined shortly 
after. Sony is also developing into a long-term partner. These companies all seem to 
regard their substantial contributions as profitable investments. A different sign of 
successful brand-building is the receipt by the Champions League of the TV industry’s 
‘Oscar’ awarded through the Broadcast Design Association for the best European 
appearance in the sports business in March 2004. These ‘soft’ factors again have 
substantial positive financial implications for clubs taking part in the Champions 
League, for example in terms of sponsoring and merchandising, even though the impact 
of Champions League participation on these areas is difficult to measure. Overall, our 
interviewing of officials at the bigger Bundesliga clubs has revealed that – due to the 
above developments – the Champions League brand and its monetary implications have 
generated substantial appeal to them. Clubs like Borussia Dortmund and Bayer 
Leverkusen are aware of the fact that their performances in the Champions League have 
considerably raised their images nationally and internationally and that their 
membership in the G-14 forum is primarily owing to that. Overall the Champions 
League has altered the economic structure of European club football. Given domestic 
(broadcasting) background conditions, it is of particular appeal to Bundesliga clubs.  
  There is another aspect which is fostered by the Champions League (and by the 
increase of foreign-born players following from ‘Bosman’): the potential development 
of a ‘European public space’ (Brown 2000: 142). It has been noted that in contrast to 
processes on the level of elites, the general public is still for the most part inward-
looking. As noted by Kohler-Koch (2002: 6), language barriers, strong national or local 
identities and traditions hold back the development of such transnational public space. 
The argument here is that football plays an important role in forming allegiances and 
identities at the national, local and supranational level, as it draws on an emotional 
investment by the supporter. If football is indeed an important expression of supporters’ 
(collective) identities, cultural diversities could be given a more positive expression 
through football, and more ‘European’ allegiances could be reinforced. If fans’ teams 
are increasingly composed of foreign-born (European) players, as is the case across the 
entire Bundesliga, and as their favourite players are gradually more non-native 
                                                 
24 Between 1992/1993 and 2003/2004  the Champions League has generated an average attendance of 
37.073, more than any national football league during that period.  
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Europeans – such as the popular Dutch Rafael van der Vaart, the Czech Jan Koller or 
the Frenchman Bixente Lizarazu – this is likely to challenge existing identity patterns. 
As noted by the Economist, “over the past decade European football teams have turned 
into a living, breathing embodiment of European integration”.
25 Such tendencies are 
also reinforced by high audience quotas of Champions League games and the positive 
imagery and brand as well as high status attached to European-level competitions more 
generally. As for the German case, no data or studies examining this argument more 
closely are known to the authors.
26 In any case, the level of change is difficult to 
measure. Judging from media coverage and preliminary interviewing, it can be 
suggested that the impact of the Champions League in that respect may be quite 
substantial. Of course, these tentative findings do not replace proper empirical research 
on this issue, which would however go beyond the scope of this paper. 
 
 
Case 5 – The G-14 
 
Apart from processes of ‘EU-Europeanisation’ other transnational dynamics, which 
emanate from football clubs, come into play as demonstrated in the previous case. What 
happened in the last decade in this regard is that in the context of new technological 
(broadcasting) and legal (EU) developments and given the new financial dimensions of 
professional football (Champions League), new forms of European transnational 
networks have evolved, most prominently the so-called G-14.  
The G-14 – sometimes labelled the “European club of the rich”
27 – is a self-
selected and self-recruiting interest group of today 18 big European football clubs. Its 
legal structure is that of a European Economic Interest Group (EEIG), which means that 
it is embedded in the instruments of the Community for facilitating and encouraging 
transnational cooperation between firms (as it was originally intended by the 
Community). It seems self-evident that its principal aim is to promote the interests of 
the member clubs and to analyse all matters of common interests.
28 In other words: it is 
a lobby group on behalf of the mainly commercial interests of leading European clubs. 
                                                 
25 Economist, 29 May 2003, 55. 
26 For the English context, see Brown (2000) and King (2000).  
27 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 01 December 2004; see also Brown, who labels it the “self styled 
‘G14 group’ of Europe’s richest clubs” (Brown 2000: 137). 
28 See www.g14.com.  
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Of great importance for the formation of the G-14 was the proposal of the Italian media 
organisation Media Partners in 1998 to establish a European Super League, a break-
away league, in order to generate higher revenues from European-wide competitions 
than under the scheme of the UEFA Champions League (Parrish 2002: 11). Although 
UEFA countered with a change of format of the Champions League (Kruse and Quitzau 
2003: 15)
29 that appeased the big clubs, the G-14 did not cease to exist but, quite 
contrary, took steps to formalise and in 2000, constituted itself officially as the 
European lobby group ‘G-14’ with a General Manager who had been a key figure in the 
logistical organisation of UEFA Champions League before (Ducrey et al. 2003: 61). 
Three German clubs are members of the G-14: Bayern München from its 
starting, Borussia Dortmund was invited to join in 1999, Bayer Leverkusen in 2002. 
German clubs in sum rank fourth concerning their votes – if one wants to group the 
votes in the General Assembly of the G-14 by nations. At the Management Committee, 
the de facto leading organ of the G-14, which generally sets the agenda, the ‘German 
contribution’ has been for some time Vice Chairman Karl-Heinz Rummenigge, who 
through his position at Bayern München and his involvements with the DFL and FIFA 
has sometimes been named the ‘ambassador of the G-14’.
30 
The G-14, as will be shown in the remainder of this section, generated dynamics 
at three levels – vis-à-vis the European Commission, vis-à-vis UEFA/FIFA and 
‘inward-looking’ among its members – thereby contributing to Europeanisation 
processes in the realm of football. 
In 2001, the G-14 opened an office in Brussels. The choice of this place, seen 
from the G-14 as “entirely natural” not least since main institutions of the EU are 
located there
31, reflects the growing awareness in football circles that the European 
Union has become a centre of gravity or at least a power centre for football.
32 In the 
case of the G-14, it also reflects the fact that the Commission has been regarded by the 
leading clubs as a potential ally (vis-à-vis the various associations) in reforming football 
according to the ‘business perspective’ (Ducrey et al. 2003: 34). Interestingly, while the 
                                                 
29 As Kruse and Quitzau put it, the introduction of more group matches increases the number of matches 
to be played and thus the revenues that can be expected from the clubs that take part, see Kruse and 
Quitzau (2003: 15). 
30 Besides, Michael Meier of Borussia Dortmund has been Vice Chairman of the Management Committee 
until recently. Now, Uli Hoeness of Bayern München belongs to the Management Committee. 
31 See www.g14.com 
32 In 2003, the UEFA has also opened an office in Brussels to liaise (more easily and efficiently) with the 
EU.  
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G-14 has not been recognised by either UEFA or FIFA as an official organisation, the 
European Commission has not acted in a reserved manner and allowed the G-14 to 
explain its position as ‘employer’ of footballers in the talks between FIFA and the 
Commission about a new transfer regime in 2001. Thus, the relationship between the G-
14 and the Commission has been characterised to some degree by mutual recognition of 
the respective positions. It did not generate any discernible pressure or counter pressure, 
but it certainly has reinforced ‘Europeanising’ mechanisms within the G-14 because of 
the Commission’s acceptance of the group as a legitimate football organisation. 
The orientation of the G-14 towards Europe can be explained by reference to the 
creational powers of the EU as well as its members’ interest in revenues from lucrative 
European competitions (the Champions League in reality and the breakaway Super 
League as a rather implicit threat to UEFA). UEFA, not surprisingly, has a somewhat 
distanced relationship to the G-14, but recent developments hint at its attempt to 
strengthen ties with European football clubs either to accommodate the G-14 or to 
weaken it. In this regard, the UEFA Club Forum was established in 2002 as an expert 
panel (with the status of an advisory body) with members of 102 European clubs as 
members. Similarly, the European Professional Football Leagues (EPFL), an 
association of 15 professional leagues founded in 1998, has recently become more vocal 
as it has been trying to establish itself as the fifty-third association alongside the various 
national associations within UEFA. These developments also show that German 
football officials have contributed to some counter trends to the G-14 as well, since the 
strengthening of the EPFL has been partially caused by leading actors of the DFL.
33 
Some see the emerging EPFL as a potential gravedigger for the G-14, some 
interpret the UEFA Club Forum as a ‘rival firm’ to the G-14 (which is hard to sustain 
because of several personal cross-connections) – but important from our point of view is 
that a more and more complex web of transnational networks and relationships has been 
established throughout the realm of European football, mainly through and with 
reference to the G-14 grouping. The G-14 itself thereby represents a qualitatively 
different type of transnationalism from those of UEFA or FIFA, since the latter are, 
above all, constituted through national associations (cf. Lehmkuhl 2004: 182). The 
transnational character of the G-14, on the other hand, is based more on personal 
relationships between top executives, which have frequent contact with each other and 
                                                 
33 See ‚Straub fordert direkte Mitsprache bei UEFA’, in: ZDF.de, 30 November 2004.  
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act on the basis of interests which overlap for a good part; moreover, national regards 
tend to dissolve
34, in contrast to UEFA where national interests from time to time seem 
to be more important. The G-14, to sum it up, could level some pressure on 
FIFA/UEFA by promoting the interests of its member clubs vis-à-vis European 
institutions and the football associations themselves. Attempts of UEFA and other 
actors to accommodate some demands of football clubs within European football 
governance have been provoked by the G-14. The grouping itself adds to the growing 
Europeanisation of football in Europe, because it generates a ‘Europeanising’, inward-
directed dynamic through providing a trans-national platform for the articulation of 
common interests. 
It would, however, be slightly exaggerated to see the G-14 grouping as first and 
foremost a socialising instance (emitting Europeanising impulses) for the clubs 
involved. The recent gestures of Bayern Munich, for instance, make quite clear that the 
clubs still have a strong instrumental view of the G-14 as a lobbying venue. If it is to be 
used as a tool to influence UEFA (regarding the selling of broadcasting rights of the 
Champions League) or institutions of the European Union (regarding the possibilities of 
a Salary Cap for players), the G-14 seems to be a promising venue. The latter case 
which articulates a specific German demand – vis-à-vis other European clubs – for 
reasons of competitiveness, indicates however, that the G-14 has retained strong 
national bonds. Since most clubs in the G-14 have not shown a noticeable interest in 
Salary Caps, Bayern Munich has recently come to criticize the clubs involved for their 
egoism and moved towards engaging UEFA as a potential ally.
35  
These observations do by no means invalidate our claim that the G-14 is a forum 
in which the European level of political institutions and sports’ associations is actively 
addressed; it only underscores that the European political and societal sphere has 
become a focal point of activity for German top football clubs as well.  
 
                                                 
34 Interview Dr. Christian Hockenjos , Managing Director at Borussia Dortmund, by telephone, January 
2005, see also the Ducrey et al. (2003: 60). 
35 See „Rummenigge klagt: Zuviel Egoismus in der G 14“, in: www.sportal.de, 27 November 2006; 
„Rummenigge fordert Salary Cap“, in Kicker Online, 17 November 2006.  
 
Sub-cases  Source of 
Europeanisation 
Strength of 
Pressure/Dynamic 
Addressee/ 
Affected Actors  Reaction to Pressures  Strength of 
Reaction  Degree of Change 
Bosman I: 
The Nationality 
Issue 
Top-down through 
ECJ / Commission 
(Medium) to High  DFB,  
(Football clubs) 
Formulation: no role 
Implementation: mixture 
of progressive and 
conservative transposition 
Moderate Transformation 
Bosman II: 
New Transfer 
Regime 
Top-down through 
ECJ / Commission 
Medium (to High)  FIFA, national 
associations (incl. 
DFB) 
Formulation:  
engagement and 
confrontation 
High  ‘Heavy adjustment’ 
Broadcasting  
Rights  
 
Top-down through 
Commission 
Medium DFB/DFL  Formulation:  
engagement 
(Relatively) High  Adjustment 
Transnational / 
bottom-up [still 
privileged actors: 
big clubs, media] 
Medium (to High)  UEFA  Acquiescence and support  Medium  Champions League 
‘Champions League’ 
itself 
Medium 
 
(Low to) Medium 
(big) clubs 
 
European public 
Support 
 
Support 
Medium 
 
Low? 
 
(‘Heavy’) 
Adjustment 
 
(hints at possible 
transformation?) 
Low   EU Commission  Support  Low (to Medium) 
Medium  UEFA / FIFA  Confrontation and 
engagement 
Medium (to High) 
G-14  Transnational / 
bottom-up [still 
privileged actors: 
reps of big clubs] 
High  inward-directed  ? ? 
Adjustment? Conclusions 
 
The above analysis indicates that our five sub-cases represent rather different 
Europeanisation processes. Bosman I is characterised by strong top-down EU pressures 
on the DFB (and German clubs) to change nationality restrictions, which were mediated 
through a mixture of progressive and conservative transposition, while domestic and 
transnational actors did hardly intervene in the policy formulation period. As a result, 
we have a high degree of change, adequately described as ‘transformation’, which is 
indicated not least in the very large share of UEFA residents playing in the Bundesliga. 
The second case, Bosman II, can be described as medium to strong European level/EU 
pressure on FIFA and national associations (including the DFB) to change the transfer 
regime. Domestic and transnational agents already became involved in the policy 
formulation phase and built up considerable opposition against the line pursued by the 
Commission. Hence, it was possible to prevent a complete overhaul of the transfer 
system, but (heavy) adjustments had to be made. Thirdly, as for the broadcasting case, 
we witnessed medium pressure from the Commission on the German Football 
Association and the German Football League to change the centralised marketing 
model. The DFB and DFL effectively engaged and opposed the Commission on this 
issue and thus managed to reduce Europeanisation pressures, as a result of which the 
current broadcasting system merely has to be adjusted. 
  Cases four and five are characterised by rather different sources of 
Europeanisation, emanating from domestic and above all transnational spheres. The 
Champions League case represents a more complex process in which big football clubs 
and media companies exerted considerable pressure on an acquiescencing and 
somewhat supportive UEFA for an extension and upgrading of European club 
competitions. The resulting Champions League, especially due to its very significant 
financial implications, has to some extent altered the economic structure of European 
club football, acting as a pull factor particularly to German clubs, given domestic 
(broadcasting) background conditions. However, the impact of the Champions League 
(together with the increase of foreign-born players following from Bosman) is more 
profound than that; it may also contribute to the development of a European public 
space, in terms of forming allegiances and identities on the level of ordinary citizens. 
Finally, the G-14 case is driven by transnational pressures from the biggest European 
football clubs with rather different reactions on the EU level (Commission), on the level  
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of European/international football associations (UEFA and FIFA) and within the G-14 
itself. While the Commission has been rather supportive, the UEFA tends to see the G-
14 as a rival institution that needs to be somewhat held in check. Internally, the G-14 
has witnessed certain socialisation processes (and the development of common 
perspectives). G-14 Europeanisation processes have proceeded rather unevenly, but 
nevertheless had a moderate impact on the German (and European) football regime. 
  We have aimed at exploring the applicability of Europeanisation concepts and 
categorisations – mainly derived from the analysis of political contexts – to other fields 
of social interaction. Overall, our systematisation of Europeanisation into different 
stages and categories has proven useful for an analysis of different Europeanisation 
processes in the area of German football. The last two sub-cases, which were 
characterised by considerable complexity, have indicated the boundaries of utility of our 
typology, as the variety of dynamics became increasingly difficult to capture. 
Categorisation (and thus implicitly conceptual parsimony) is always, to some extent, a 
trade-off with the complexity of empirical ‘reality’.  
  Our analysis also adds to one of the most widely discussed issues in the 
Europeanisation debate, namely the causal relevance of the EU concerning domestic 
developments. If we look at the first three sub-cases in isolation, we have some scope 
for a comparative analysis, as these units are adequately homogenous. Values on the 
explanatory variable (the level of EU pressures) vary across these sub-cases between 
high (Bosman I) and medium (broadcasting). The three sub-cases indicate that the level 
of EU pressure indeed seems to have causal relevance. High EU pressures in Bosman I 
(accompanied with only medium intervening counter-reactions) have led to a 
transformation of the nationality regime. By contrast, only medium pressures in the case 
of  broadcasting (albeit accompanied by stronger counter-reactions) has only led to 
(minor) adjustments of the existing broadcasting model. The Bosman II case also fits 
into this sequence: medium to high EU pressures met by strong intervening counter-
reactions lead to heavy adjustment of the transfer regime. While this comparison 
suggests that the EU matters, it also indicates that control/intervening variables, i.e. 
domestic and transnational/societal responses are also important factors to be reckoned 
with. While this has been made explicit for the domestic level in the literature, it is less 
obvious vis-à-vis societal/transnational dynamics. 
  European Integration Studies benefit from an analysis of (German) football in 
several ways. Most importantly, it highlights the under-researched societal/transnational  
 
31
dimension of a central theme in EU Studies, i.e. Europeanisation. Our analysis of 
football has allowed us to draw attention to societal spheres and transnational agency 
as important aspects/properties of change in Europeanisation processes. This also 
enabled us to go beyond the conventional top-down (and bottom-up) approaches 
dominating this (sub-)field, thus accounting for the complexity of the process. At the 
same time, our analysis contributed to ascertaining the utility of Europeanisation 
factors/categorisations – mainly derived from the analysis of political contexts – to 
explain dynamics in societal, i.e. rather non-political, contexts. 
 
   
 
References 
 
Barnard, B. (2000) ‘The Business of Soccer’, Europe, 401: 28-9. 
Börzel, T. (2001) Shaping States and Regions. The Domestic Impact of Europe, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Börzel, T.A. (2002) ‘Member State Responses to Europeanization’, Journal of Common 
Market Studies, 40: 193-214. 
Brand, A. and Niemann, A. (2005) ‚The Societal/Trans-national Dimension of 
Europeanisation: The Case of German Football’, Queen's Papers on 
Europeanisation  2/05, Queen's University Belfast. 
Brown, A. (2000) ‘European Football and the European Union: Governance, 
Participation and Social Cohesion – Towards a Policy Research Agenda’, Soccer 
and Society, 1: 129-50. 
Bugdahn, S. (2005) ‘Of Europeanization and Domestication: the Implementation of the 
Environmental Information Directive in Ireland, Great Britain and Germany’, 
Journal of European Public Policy, 12: 177-99. 
Caporaso, A. and Jupille, J. (2001) ‘The Europeanization of Social Policy and Domestic 
Political Change’, in M. Green Cowles, J. Caporaso and T. Risse (eds.), 
Transforming Europe. Europeanization and Domestic Change, Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press. 
Collier, D. (1995), ‘Translating Quantitative Methods for Qualitative Researchers: The 
Case of Selection Bias’, American Political Science Review, 89: 461-66. 
Croci, O. (2001) Taking the Field: the EC and the Governance of European Football, 
Paper presented at the 7
th ECSA-USA International Conference, Madison 
(Wisconsin), 31 May – 2 June. 
Croci, O. and Forster, J. (2004) ‘Webs of Authority: Hierarchies, Networks, 
Legitimacy, and Economic Power in Global Sport Organizations’ in G.T. Papanikos 
(ed.), The Economics and Management of Mega Athletic Events: Olympic Games, 
Professional Sports, and Other Essays, Athens: ATINER.   
 
32
Deutsch, K. et al. (1957) Political Community and the North Atlantic Area, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
Deutsch, K. (1953) Nationalism and Social Communication, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT 
Press. 
Ducrey, P., Ferreira, C.E., Huerta, G. and Marston, K.T. (2003) UEFA and Football 
Governance, Project Work, Neuchâtel: CIES. 
Dyson, K. (1999) ‘EMU as Europeanization: Convergence, Diversity and Contingency’, 
Journal of Common Market Studies, 38: 645-66. 
Ebbinghaus, B. (1998) ‘Europe Through the Looking-Glass: Comparative and Multi-
Level Perspectives’, Acta Sociologica, 41: 301-13. 
European Commission (2003) New Marketing System for Bundesliga Broadcasting 
Rights, Press Release IP/03/1106, Brussels, 24 July. 
European Commission (2005) Details of broadcasting rights commitments by the 
German Football League, Press Release MEMO/05/16, Brussels, 19 January. 
Feron, E. (2004) ‘Anti-Globalization Movements and the European Agenda. Between 
Dependence and Disconnection’, Innovation, 17: 119-27. 
Foster, K. (2000) ‘European Law and Football: Who’s in Charge?’, in J. Garland et al. 
(eds.), The Future of Football – Challenges for the Twenty-First Century, London: 
Frank Cass. 
Haas, E. (1958) The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces, 1950-7, 
London: Stevens. 
Hartcourt, A. and Radaelli, C. (1999) ‘Limits to EU Technocratic Regulation?’, 
European Journal of Political Research, 35: 107-22. 
Héritier, A., Kerwer, D., Knill, C., Lehmkuhl, D. and Teutsch, M. (2001) Differential 
Europe. New Opportunities and Constraints for National Policy-Making, Lanham: 
Rowman and Littlefield. 
Howell, C.E. (2004) ‘Developing Conceptualisations of Europeanization: Synthesising 
Methodological Approaches’, Queen’s Papers on Europeanization, no. 3: 2-13. 
King, A. (2000) ‘Football Fandom and Post-national Identity in the New Europe’, 
British Journal of Sociology, 54: 419-42. 
Kipker, I. (2002) ‘Sind Salary Caps im europäischen Fußball umsetzbar und sinnvoll?’, 
Sportökonomie, 1, online available <http://www.ak-spooek.de/html/dez2.HTM> 
Kohler-Koch, B. (2002) The Transformation of Governance in Europe, Paper presented 
at the Colloquium ‘The Future of Europe Challenges Ahead’, Maastricht University, 
6 September,  online available <www.sowi.uni-mannheim.de/lehrstuehle/lspol2/ 
service/dl/Maastricht-Sept02.doc>. 
Knill, C. (2001) The Europeanisation of National Administrations, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Knill, C. and Lehmkuhl, D. (2002) ‘The National Impact of European Union Regulatory 
Policy: Three Europeanization Mechanisms’, European Journal of Political 
Research, 41: 255-80.  
 
33
Kruse, J. and Quitzau, J. (2003) Fußball-Fernsehrechte: Aspekte der 
Zentralvermarktung, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg, Fächergruppe 
Volkswirtschaftslehre, Diskussionspapier 18. 
Ladrech, R. (1994) ‘Europeanisation of Domestic Politics and Institutions: The Case of 
France’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 32: 69-88. 
Lehmkuhl, D. (2004) ‘Der lange Schatten staatlichen Rechts: Verrechtlichung im 
transnationalen Sport’, in B. Zangl and M. Zürn (eds.), Verrechtlichung – Baustein 
für Global Governance? Bonn: Dietz. 
Lodge, M. (2002) ‘Varieties of Europeanisation and the National Regulatory State’, 
Public Policy and Administration, 17: 43-67. 
Marcotti, G. (2004) ‘The Marx Brothers on Warpath’, The Times Online, 4 October, 
online available <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,3361-1292867,00.html>. 
Mayer, F.C. and Palmowski, J. (2004) ‘European Identities and the EU – The Ties that 
Bind the Peoples of Europe’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 42: 573-98. 
McGowan, F. (2000) ‘Competition Policy. The Limits of the European Regulatory 
State’, in H. Wallace and W. Wallace, Policy-Making in the European Union, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Meier, H.E. (2004) Von Bosman zur Kollektivvereinbarung? Die Regulierung des 
Arbeitsmarktes für Profifußballer, online available <http://www.uni-
potsdam.de/u/ls_verwaltung/ 
Forschung/Von%20Bosman%20zur%20Kollektivvereinbarung_.pdf>. 
Menz, G. (2003) ‘Re-regulating the Single Market: National Varieties of Capitalism and 
Their Responses to Europeanization’, Journal of European Public Policy, 10: 532-
55. 
Niemann, A. (forthcoming 2006) Explaining decisions in the European Union, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Olsen, J.P. (2002) ‘The Many Faces of Europeanisation’, Journal of Common Market 
Studies, 40: 921-52. 
Radaelli, C.M. (2004) ‘Europeanisation: Solution or Problem?’, European Integration 
online Papers, 8, online available <http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2004-016a.htm>. 
Radaelli, C. (2000) ‘Whither Europeanisation? Concept Stretching and Substantive 
Change’,  European Integration online Papers, 4, online available 
<http://eiop.or.at/eiop/ texte/2000-008a.htm> 
Parrish, R. (2003) Sports Law and Policy in the European Union, Manchester: 
Manchester University Press. 
Parrish, R. (2002) ‘Football’s Place in the Single European Market’, Soccer and 
Society, 3: 1-21. 
Risse, T. (2004) ‘Social Constructivism and European Integration’, in T. Diez and A. 
Wiener (eds.), European Integration Theory, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Risse, T. (2002) ‘Transnational Actors in World Politics’, in W. Carlsnaes et al. (eds.), 
Handbook of International Relations, London: Sage.  
 
34
Risse, T. Caporaso, J. and Green Cowles, M. (2001) ‘Europeanization and Domestic 
Change. Introduction’, in M. Cowles, J. Caporaso and T. Risse (eds.), Transforming 
Europe, Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press. 
Schmidt, V. (2002) ‘Europeanization and the Mechanics of Economic Policy 
Adjustments’, Journal of European Public Policy, 9: 894-912. 
Stone Sweet, A. and Sandholtz, W. (1997) ‘European Integration and Supranational 
Governance’, Journal of European Public Policy, 4: 297-317. 
Vink, M. (2002) What is Europeanization? And other Questions on a New Research 
Agenda,  Paper for the Second YEN Research Meeting on Europeanisation, 
University of Bocconi, Milan, 22-23 November. 
Wallace, H. (2000) ’Europeanisation and Globalisation: Complementary or 
Contradictory Trends?’, New Political Economy, 5: 369-82. 
Weatherill, S. (2003) ‘”Fair Play Please!” Recent Developments in the Application of 
EC Law to Sport’, Common Market Law Review, 40: 51-93. 
Winn, N. (2003) ‘The European Union’s External Face: The ‘Europeanisation’ of JHA 
and CFSP’, Perspectives on European Politics and Society, 4: 147-66. 